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Pollock, goes a long way toward filling that gap. In
this conversation, conducted in 1985—a year before
his death—Prebisch reviews some of the key moments
in his life and that of ECLAC. The material covers the
period from 1948 to 1963, from Prebisch’s
incorporation into the organization up to the early
sixties, when he left ECLAC to become the first director
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
In this interview, Prebisch discusses the politics as
well as personal aspects of his entry into ECLAC, as well
as providing an account of how he wrote the agency’s
manifesto, The Economic Development of Latin
America and its Principal Problems (first published in
Spanish, in 1949). Prebisch’s international role is also
treated in the interview. For instance, he explains the
part he played in the creation of the Alliance for
Progress in 1961, making it clear that although he was
involved, he was not the originator of the programme.
His relations with the United States government, the
Organization of American States, and the Bretton
Woods agencies (the IMF and the World Bank) also
receive attention. Prebisch’s passion for advancing the
economic integration of Latin America, and his candid
estimate of the success of that endeavour, are both
presented here.
Readers may be surprised by the frankness of the
views expressed by Prebisch, famous for his discretion
and diplomatic skills. In addition, Prebisch treats the
personalities of the early ECLAC team, as well as those
David Pollock, Daniel Kerner
and Joseph L. Love*
Introduction
This issue of CEPAL Review attests to the lasting
influence of Raúl Prebisch’s ideas and policies on
development in Latin America and the Third World in
general. Prebisch’s thesis of unequal exchange and his
conception of the world economy as organized in a
Centre-Periphery relationship, however controversial,
has earned him a recognized place in the history of
development thought. Through ECLAC and later
UNCTAD, Prebisch’s ideas affected governments and
institutions throughout Latin America and around the
world. The theoretical origins and evolution of
Prebisch’s thought have received extensive treatment
by economists and historians.1 Yet how Prebisch built
his team at ECLAC and how he conveyed his theses at
the regional and international levels have not been
widely treated. The following interview given by
Prebisch to his longtime assistant and friend, David
* D. Pollock: Former staff member of ECLAC and UNCTAD
(dpollock@ccs.carleton.ca). D. Kerner: Graduate History
Programme, History Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign (kerner@uiuc.edu). J.L. Love: Professor of History,
History Department, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
(j-love@uiuc.edu).
1
 See for example the bibliographical essay in Love, “Economic
Ideas and Ideologies in Latin America since 1930” in Leslie Bethell,
ed., The Cambridge History of Latin America, Cambridge, U.K.,
Cambridge University Press, 1994, vol. 6, part 1, pp. 595-601.
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of actors in U.S. and international agencies. One gets a
clear view of Prebisch’s style of leadership, and the
political possibilities and constraints ECLAC faced in a
region subject to the enormous influence of the United
States.
The following interview was conducted by David
Pollock in Washington, D.C., in May 1985, a year
before Prebisch’s death. Pollock, a Canadian, was
Prebisch’s assistant and close collaborator in both
ECLAC and UNCTAD, and knew intimately his
interviewee, the issues Prebisch faced, and the milieus
in which he moved. Pollock held important posts in
ECLAC between 1950 and 1963 (in Santiago, Mexico
City, and Washington), and moved with Prebisch to
UNCTAD in the latter year, remaining in that organization
until 1967. Later, Pollock was head of the Washington
Office of ECLAC. He had long intended to record
Prebisch’s reminiscences on tape, but the opportunity
to do so only arose when Prebisch underwent eye
surgery in Washington and was temporarily unable to
work. At that moment, he invited Pollock to interview
him at length. Pollock recorded twelve hours of
conversation, of which this material is an excerpt.
In the following text, the words are those used by
Raúl Prebisch and his interlocutor, David Pollock,
except for a few connecting words and phrases,
indicated by square brackets. The conversations were
edited by Joseph L. Love and Daniel Kerner to eliminate
digressions and repetitions, and the ellipses ( … ) were
removed in order to facilitate the flow of the text.
Footnotes have been supplied to identify persons and
institutions mentioned in the conversations.
The interview
David Pollock (D.P.) What brought you into ECLA in
1948?
Raúl Prebisch (R.P.) I read in a newspaper that there
was a meeting in the United Nations whereby they had
created an Economic Commission for Latin America. I
read that with indifference. However, a few days later,
members of the French delegation to the United Nations
approached me in Buenos Aires, telling me that the
French government would wish me to present my name
as a candidate [for the post of Executive Secretary] in
the United Nations. After I’d been the head of the
Central Bank of Argentina, it appeared to me as a
demotion2. They would not explain to me the meaning
of the words “Executive Secretary.” In my view it was
just to make reports of meetings and so forth. So I wasn’t
interested. I was rather attracted by what the President
of the Academy of Economic Science in Buenos Aires
had then offered me, to start a Review. Then, sometime
afterwards, a few weeks after, I had a call from
Benjamín Cohen. [He was] a distinguished Chilean,
whom I had met at student meetings in Buenos Aires.
He was Under-Secretary for Public Information and he
said to me, “I am sent by Trygve Lie3 to formally offer
you the post of Executive Secretary of ECLA.”
At that time, I still had the illusion to continue being
a Professor at the University of Buenos Aires. The salary
was rather small, but I had reduced my standard of living
to fit it. I had sold my Cadillac and rented my house on
the Barranca de San Isidro. Adelita4 was willing to
accompany me on this type of life. I had decided to
devote some years to research, so I said to Benjamín,
“I am not tempted.” On the other hand, I had seen the
League of Nations as a young consultant for the World
Economic Conference of 1933 and I saw that we
–members of developing countries– had nothing to do
in that atmosphere. We were at the margin. So I said,
on the phone, “I’m not interested. I’m very thankful,
but not interested. On the other hand, I am leaving
tomorrow morning to Venezuela because the Minister
of Finance there, whom I do not know, has invited me
to write a report on two projects of law: reforming the
Central Bank and the Banking Laws.” “Well,” he said,
“I’m a very close friend of Pérez Guerrero, the Minister.
So I will go there and try to persuade you to accept.” I
said, “Benjamín, you will lose your time. My
determination is very firm.” Well, I went to Venezuela
and I did what I had to do. Anyhow, when [Gustavo]
Martínez Cabañas was appointed [as ECLA’s first
Executive Secretary], he and [Eugenio] Castillo, a
Cuban who was at that time the third man in ECLA,
went to Buenos Aires to ask me to spend a few months
in Santiago, to write the introduction to the first
Economic Survey of Latin America. I accepted for two
reasons. First, because I said, “Well, let us try.” Second,
it coincided with a resolution of the University of
Buenos Aires to dismiss me as a Professor. I was not a
man looked at with sympathy by some highly nationalist
groups who were trying to get room for themselves.
2
 Prebisch was Director-General of the Central Bank of Argentina
between 1935 and 1943.
3
 Trygve Halvdan Lie (1896-1968), a Norwegian who was the first
Secretary-General of the United Nations (1946 to 1952).
4
 Prebisch’s first wife, née Adela Moll.
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D.P. So the consultancy came at just the right moment.
R.P. And I went to Santiago. I never had lived in
Santiago. I had spent a night there en route to Mexico.
I was impressed by this nice city, with the beautiful
view of the mountains, the friendship of the people,
the running water in the street, the nice atmosphere.
D.P. And good wine.
R.P. Good wine. And last but not least, Louis Swenson.
Louis, as you well know, was a man who inspired
sympathy.
D.P. Yes.
R.P. And we used to talk and walk, and I started thinking
about the nature of this Introduction. As usually
happens, I sat down for days without taking any notes.
This helps me to speak without notes, because of the
sequence of the ideas, and during the month I did not
write a word (laughs). Castillo would visit me saying,
“Raúl, how is your writing going?” “Nothing yet.
Nothing yet” I would say. And Louis, “Raúl, you know
you have two girls who are excellent typists and who
can take dictation.” I don’t dictate these important
things, you know. And I saw their great concern. They
probably said to themselves: “Well, this man is a
failure.”
D.P. Wasting their money.
R.P. A good Central Banker [perhaps they thought],
but we need this report. Finally I decided to write,
and in three or four days I wrote the whole
Introduction to the first Economic Survey. It
contained our view of the problems at that moment,
international as well as Latin American problems,
and the close interrelationship between them. These
were the result of all my readings and reflections in
those three, four, or five years of meditations. They
sent the Introduction to Headquarters in New York. I
signed the report. Nobody had told me I should not
sign. A few days later, New York sent the longest
cable that I have ever seen in my life and that,
regrettably, does not exist in New York or in Santiago
(according to regulations these things are destroyed
after 30 years). It’s a pity, because in this cable they
made a series of considerations that ended in the
following form: “The report is a document with a
great content. But it speaks about development,
industrialization, terms of trade, and many other
matters that ECLA is not supposed to deal with. ECLA
has no instructions to deal with these problems. But
as the document is a serious and responsible
document, we suggest to you (Martínez Cabañas),
to present the document as an Introduction signed
by the author,  so that you will  at t ribute the
responsibility to him and not to the organization.” I
remember that Martínez Cabañas came to see me
with great concern, believing that I would react
furiously. I said, “Gustavo, I never supposed that I
would not sign the document. I put my personal ideas
there. I have not diluted these ideas. So I agree fully.”
Believe me, in the ECLA Conference in Havana the
reception of the document by Latin American
countries, including Argentina, was inconceivable.
Words of praise everywhere. On the other hand there
were conventional minds on the part of the U.S., the
same on the part of the U.K., a little better from the
French.
David Owen, whom I met for the first time in
Havana, was so impressed that he took me aside
before the end of the Conference and said “Raúl, I
cannot offer you any more [the] Executive Secretary
[post] because it is in the hands of Martínez Cabañas.
But I can [make] you Director of Research with a
salary as a consultant at least equal to his salary and
with full intellectual independence.” I said, “David,
are you willing to accept the following three
conditions? First, what is the meaning of intellectual
independence for me? Not to receive instructions
from Headquarters nor from Cabañas about what
ideas I should put on paper. Instead I should follow
my own responsibility. I think that now, no longer
being a consultant as I was before, but a man
integrated into the body of ECLA, I would have to
follow certain rules. With a sense of responsibility,
but at the same time with the possibility of presenting
problems that the developed countries would not
receive with pleasure.” He said, “Raúl, this is what
we wish in the United Nations; to open new paths.”
“Second,” I said to him, “I understand that you should
approve the appointments that I would like to make.
But every appointment should be the result of my
proposal. You can reject or accept but it has to be my
proposal. Being a man in the field, I know the people.
I know the requirements, and if you act at a great
distance, we will incur great mistakes. Third, I would
want freedom to travel. Not to ask for authorization.
Give me an amount of money and I will use it to the
best of my judgment.” “I accept your conditions,”
he said. These were the bases of my incorporation
as a regular staff member.
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D.P. How did you become Executive Secretary so
quickly?
R.P. Well, it was obvious that the situation existing at
that time would not last for long. Martínez Cabañas
was an excellent fellow. But he was a young man who
never before had that type of responsibility. Our
personal relations were good. But everybody
understood that the real authority was mine. Then, in a
trip of mine to New York, to Lake Success5, David Owen
said to me, “We are going to create a new entity in the
United Nations for technical assistance. The Secretary
General offers this to you, or the post of ECLA Executive
Secretary, in which case we will accommodate Martínez
Cabañas in the new organization. Which do you
prefer?” I said, “tell Trygve Lie that I would accept
whatever he likes. If he wants me to come to New York,
to this new institution, I would go. If he likes me to
stay as ECLA Executive Secretary, I will accept because
I like this organization and I see the problems and
challenges as I could not see them before.” That
afternoon, he said: “Trygve Lie said you should be
Executive Secretary.”
D.P. Why did you reorganize ECLA the way you did?
The Development Division was very large and powerful.
R.P. Due to the role of development in Latin America.
D.P. Describe some of your key early staff, some of the
important beginners. You had Ahumada, Urquidi,
Furtado, Melnik, Santa Cruz, Boti, Noyola, Vuscovic.
Did you pick them all or were they there when you
came?
R.P. When I came there were Furtado, Boti, García and
Rey Alvarez. They were consultants, the last two.
Urquidi, Ahumada, Melnik, Noyola, and Vuscovic came
later. How did [Pedro] Vuscovic come? A Peruvian
professor was hired as a consultant in statistical matters
and brought a young man, Vuscovic. I remember that
Vuscovic was working in a small room at the entrance
of Calle Providencia with a calculating machine. He
showed intellectual abilities and he made a good career.
[Jorge] Ahumada entered later and Melnik too. We
took Melnik from the Corporación de Fomento. He was
a very effective man, very effective, a great man and a
nice person. Different from Ahumada. Ahumada, at the
beginning, entered with a great arrogance. But gradually
he was integrated. And once in Brazil, five years later,
in a cocktail party that was prolonged until late, he said,
“Don Raúl, I don’t know, I cannot understand how you
have tolerated me for such a long time because
everything that you said, I disagreed with. And you were
patient enough not to say, Jorge, why do you disagree?”
And we became good friends. He was a very intelligent
man, a good writer, and full of force.
D.P. Did your staff write papers and give them to you
to read? How did you work with them? Did you ask
them questions? I wasn’t in ECLA really until 1953, but
I had the impression that you did most of the key writing
in the first 3 or 4 years. What was the way in which you
worked? Did you invite papers, read them, and absorb
what they said? Or did people write on their own?
R.P. Well as you said, there were different sections.
Indeed they produced papers, a series of reports, many
of which were published in the pre-[CEPAL] Review,
the Bulletin, or printed in mimeograph and distributed.
I took advantage of some of their ideas, I used to discuss
with them, [but] was not very fond of big staff meetings,
rather meetings with one, or two, or three people.
D.P. You used to keep your office closed for certain hours
each day?
R.P. Yes, in order to produce my own papers. I didn’t
have open doors. But most of what I wrote was after
everybody went to their homes, on Saturdays, and on
holidays. The final decision was made by me, but
always after listening. I would not try to present papers
with the style of presenting compromises saying:
“There are some who believe this and others who
believe that.” I would only put what I believe, and I
would not eliminate the presentation of other papers
with different views, but my personal ideas, my personal
papers, would not be compromise papers.
D.P. You had a few key U.S. staff members: Louis
Swenson, Alex Ganz and Richard Mallon come to mind.
Did you pick them to have a U.S. presence or was that
part of the game? In other words, there was always a
gulf between you and the U.S. government. Did you
pick some staff to make a showing to the U.S.
government that you wanted Americans or were they
picked for you?
R.P. Not at all. I promoted Louis Swenson because he
was very able, intellectually very open, and morally a
5
 Lake Success, New York, was the first site of the United Nations
headquarters, while permanent facilities were being constructed in
New York City.
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superb man. He would be in charge of ECLA for a month
or two while I was outside, and neither one of us would
be suspicious of the other. It was a perfect team. Louis
had a great critical mind. This is one of the reasons
why I did not prefer to have a collegium office. Rather,
I’d give a paper of mine to Louis, to let him make the
criticism. He was free to criticize everything and he
had a sharp mind.
D.P. Yes. I remember he wrote that first paper on
European-Latin American economic relations, which
was very solid. And Alex Ganz? How come you picked
him? You wanted somebody on national income and
Alex had worked in Puerto Rico?
R.P. Alex Ganz was a very good example of the
cooperation of an American economist. He worked
strenuously. He introduced new techniques.
D.P. National income techniques especially.
R.P. He was integrated personally with the boys, and
was not eager to go back to the U.S. and publish on the
basis of what he’d learned from us. He tried to live for
ECLA. This is something that I always remember as one
of the great merits of Alex Ganz. Others went there
with the idea of taking easy fruits. Of publishing
articles, not always paying tribute to ECLA. On the
contrary, transforming ideas of ECLA in technical terms.
D.P. Into political documents?
R.P. Yes, and reaping the merit of the work for
themselves.
D.P. I want to talk now about your initial relations with
the U.S. government. You said that I knew more about
this than you because I wrote an article in 19786, but
obviously I don’t. Relations were often very strained
between ECLAC and the U.S. government, and between
you and the U.S. government from the very beginning.
Why?
R.P. When Hernán Santa Cruz presented to the
Economic and Social Council [ECOSOC] his project for
the creation of ECLA, naturally he encountered much
opposition from the great powers, and especially from
the U.S. He persuaded Mendès-France7 and some others
to support ECLA. And finally the U.S had to accept.
Especially taking into consideration that the
Commission was initially established for only three
years, and perhaps with the idea in the back of their
minds of merging ECLA with the Organization of
American States. Indeed, when I was appointed
Executive Secretary, an ambassador who was
representing the United States at the O.A.S., a very nice
gentleman, invited me for a cocktail party in his house.
And he said to me, “My government does not like two
organizations dealing with the same problems. So we
have elaborated a project of merging the two. I may
say, first of all, that you are our candidate for being the
Director of the two organizations. And you will have
more resources than before. Here is the text: two pages.”
I read the text carefully, and I said the following, “Mr.
Ambassador, I fully understand your position. But I
have to speak very frankly with you. The basis of our
new organization, ECLA, is intellectual independence.
This is the first opportunity for Latin Americans to start
thinking with their own minds on economic problems.
This has not been the case up to now.” I was persuaded
of that, after years of meditation when I had to leave
the University of B[uenos] A[ires]. I added “I have to
tell you frankly that you would be the dominating power
in the new organization, as you dominate the
Organization of American States. The Economic
Department of that Organization is dominated by the
State Department. I understand this quite well. But
understand my point of view. If I would have yielded
my intellectual independence, perhaps I could have
continued to serve the Argentine government. But I
didn’t. And I’m not going to change at this age. And if
I had the weakness to accept your offer, not one of the
young men who are accompanying me would continue
in ECLA. Believe me, it is an exceptional group of
brilliant young men who never before happened to work
together in Latin America. Not for the salary, but for
the idea of a Latin America working in the right
direction. So I’m sorry to say to you that I cannot
accept.” Well, it was a nice drinking party. We changed
the subject, and the matter ended as a civilized parting.
This was a few weeks before the third meeting of ECLA,
which in turn was my first meeting as ECLA Executive
Secretary.
6
 David Pollock. “Some changes in the United States attitude
towards ECLA over the past 30 years” in CEPAL Review, No. 6, second
half of 1978, pp. 57-80.
7
 Pierre Mendès-France (1907-1982), subsequently Prime Minister
of France, 1954-1955.
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D.P. In Mexico?
R.P. In Mexico. First the constituting meeting in
Santiago. The second in Havana, when I spoke as
Director of Research, and this one in Mexico was my
first as Executive Secretary. Immediately before the
meeting, Antonio Carillo Flores, the Mexican Secretary
of Finance, invited me for dinner with Alberto Baltra,
Minister of Economy in Chile, with another member
of the Chilean delegation, with Merwin Bohan,8 and
with a high official of the Department of Finance. The
second Chilean was Oscar Schnake who was an old
friend. We had a nice dinner. [This was] in Mexico City.
Right away Antonio Carrillo Flores said at the table,
“Don Raúl, how do you like this Mexican wine?”
(laughs). I replied, “Dear Mr. Minister, this is not
Mexican wine.” (laughs). He was a man of good humor.
Well, after dinner, there were two sofas, with the
difference that there was room between the second sofa
and the wall. Carrillo was there with Merwin Bohan
and Baltra. I was on the side, facing them, with Schnake.
The high Mexican official was standing behind the sofa.
Then Carrillo said to Merwin, “Will you please read
your project, your draft project for the merging of the
O.A.S. with ECLA?” Merwin read it. Then Carrillo said
to me, “What do you think about it?”. I told him, “I do
not need to reflect on it because this is precisely what
they consulted me [about] in Washington and I reacted
absolutely against it, on the following grounds.” And I
repeated those grounds. You know what Carrillo did?
There are gestures in life one never forgets! “Give me
this paper,” [he] tore it up and threw it away. The matter
was settled. And poor Merwin Bohan was silent. The
U.S. had expected Mexico to support it, and Mexico
was silent. This was known, naturally. President Vargas
sent a cable to his delegation, the Brazilian delegation,
supporting ECLA. Chile was hesitating. It gathered force.
And the impetus was such that I had to help Merwin
Bohan soften a draft resolution that was extreme
(laughs). The man who established peace was Philippe
de Seynes, a member of the French delegation.
D.P. Were there any Latin American countries that did
not support you in ECLA?
R.P. All, including Argentina [supported me]. Argentina
never put me in a difficult situation, I have to recognize
this.
D.P. Tell me one small footnote, Don Raúl. Why was
the Washington Office set up in the first place? Was it
because one of the aspects of the agreement was, “All
right, if you Latin Americans are going to have a
regional commission, and we already have the O.A.S.,
then let us at least co-ordinate our work programmes
so that there will not be duplication and overlap.” Was
that why it was set up?
R.P. I could see the extraordinary importance of being
in Washington. First, as a source –as you subsequently
developed the office– of contacts between Latin
Americans and [North] Americans. As a source of
collecting information and papers.
D.P. In addition to coordinating with the O.A.S.?
R.P. That was just an excuse. The real idea was to have
a foothold there.
D.P. I see. Tell me a bit about the relationship between
Santiago and New York. You always had very good
contacts with the Secretary-General, as I understood
it. Tell me about the Secretary-General, about ECOSOC,
and about the Headquarters Administration. Three
different levels. Start with the Secretary-General. You
were always on good terms with Hammarskjöld9, with
Trygve Lie, with U Thant10. You never had any trouble
with the Secretary-General?
R.P. Absolutely none.
D.P. What about the ECOSOC and the Economic
Department? Did they try sometimes to edit your
output?
R.P. No. I may say that I had the most cordial and soft
relationship with the Department. There were several
personalities the first year, David Weintraub and Harold
Kostin. David was sacrificed by Trygve Lie in the time
of McCarthy.
David Weintraub was a man who saw the problem
of development and was enthusiastic about the work of
ECLA. The same for Harold Kostin, a Briton. But under
8
 Member of the United States delegation to the GATT conference
in 1949-1950 and United States Ambassador to the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council in the early 1950s. He knew Prebisch
when the latter was Director of the Central Bank of the Argentine
Republic in 1941-1943.
9
 Dag Hammarskjöld (1905-1961). Secretary-General of the United
Nations, 1953-1961.
10
 U Thant (1909-1974.) Secretary-General of the United Nations,
1962-1972.
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the circumstances, David Weintraub had to resign.
Harold Kostin was transferred to other functions and
new men came. David Owen came a little later.
D.P. What about the Secretaries-General? Tell me a
little bit about your personal relations with
Hammarskjöld, Trygve Lie and U Thant. You knew them
all personally?
R.P. Trygve Lie, only when I went to see him, on
accepting to be Executive Secretary. When he was in
Santiago for the ECOSOC he visited ECLAC. He visited
my office and said to me, “Well, I’m very happy with
you –because you don’t give me any political
problems.” Period! (laughs). He never interfered at all.
With Hammarskjöld I established a very cordial
relationship. To such an extent that he made an
exception: Never before had an Under-Secretary
accompanied him on a trip. He asked me to travel with
him in Latin America and we had very extensive talks
on many matters. The man was intellectually brilliant,
and he supported me in every sense.
D.P. When I was in Santiago in 1955, I worked with
José Antonio Mayobre11 and Alex Ganz on an early
ECLA document called An Introduction to the
Techniques of Planning. When that report went to New
York, a cable came back to you that got Mayobre very
excited. He showed it to me. It said, “The report is all
right, but every place where you say “planning”, delete
it and insert the word “programming”, because here
in New York we cannot have anything that supports
planning.” And you said, “O.K.” Explain to me how
come, with all this support you had –from the Secretary-
General and all those people at Headquarters– the
United Nations decided that “planning” was a bad
word and “programming” was a good word?
R.P. Not in New York. I was not concerned about heads
in New York. It was in the State Department and in the
World Bank. The Bank would not speak of “planning”,
but of “programming”. By the way, [for] many years
after, I never used the word “planning”. It was a slip of
José Antonio Mayobre to speak of “planning”. I was
speaking of “programming”.
D.P. Why has ECOSOC, which in theory is ECLA’s parent
body, never been influential? Why was it always a weak
instrument? How did ECLA manage to be so powerful
when ECOSOC itself –the parent body– was so weak?
There’s something odd about that. In many ways, ECLA
transformed Latin American economic thought and
action, for better or for worse. Import substitution,
industrialization, the whole concept of Centre and
Periphery, terms of trade, regional integration,
planning, and so on. ECLA went ahead, wrote, did things,
and influenced reality whether ECOSOC listened to it or
not. ECOSOC almost seemed irrelevant. Somehow,
there’s an anachronism to ECOSOC which I don’t
understand.
R.P. After Gunnar [Myrdal]12 left the ECE [Economic
Commission for Europe], I could captivate attention
by speaking without reading from notes, by speaking
forcefully, by affirming my convictions. And people
like that. It is an element of persuasion. If they do not
always act in that sense, at least they respect what you
do and the organization that you are representing. But
if you go and read your speech, or speak in a
monotonous voice and present many figures, you lose
influence. You have to go and discuss, as an actor. I
think this is an important element and Gunnar would
do that. He was a powerful man, and I think this was an
element. Remember, in a body like this, there are always
three or four persons with intellectual ability. They
shape the opinion about the intellectual quality of the
man who is speaking. I never have seen a face of a man
who was sleeping while I was talking. And that is
important.
D.P. [Returning to ECLA itself,] let’s begin with three
main initial contributions of ECLA to Latin American
development. One was theory. The second was let us
say technical assistance, training, and advisory
activities. And the third was political: ECLA provided a
forum for Latin Americans to meet. ECLA also provided
statistical and other such services. But, fundamentally,
the main contribution of ECLA and yourself in those
early years was in theory. You began by identifying the
dichotomy of the centre and the periphery. From 1948
until 1963, you focused fundamentally on the external
sector. Your terms-of-trade approach, your emphasis
on the need to industrialize through import substitution,
your stress on more buoyant exports. Why did you focus
so heavily on external vulnerability?
11
 Executive Secretary of ECLA, 1963-1966.
12
 Gunnar Myrdal (1898-1987). Swedish economist. He became
Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission
for Europe in 1947. Author of The Asian Drama (1968), Myrdal
shared the Nobel Prize for economics with Friedrich von Hayek in
1973.
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R.P. Because the external bottleneck was the most
important obstacle to development at that time.
D.P. Early in your life in Argentina, you were very
impressed by the vulnerability of the Argentine economy
to international shocks. But in the ECLA thesis, there
was very little emphasis on domestic phenomena. You
looked fundamentally at the problem of the foreign
exchange constraint. True, Latin America was
enormously vulnerable then. But presumably your
emphasis was also partly because you and ECLA wanted
to get political support, in those early years, from the
Latin American governments?
R.P. And because we were not prepared to extend our
thinking, suddenly, to every aspect of the economy. We
took those parts that were more important at the
moment. And gradually we extended our ideas to other
subjects.
D.P. Did your theory evolve over time? Your thesis was
very intricate. Everything was linked to everything else.
Did that evolve slowly between 1948 and 1963, or did
you have it in mind from the beginning? That is to say,
the tendency toward a secular deterioration in the terms
of trade; therefore, an effort to reduce dependency on
primary production for exports; therefore, accelerated
internal industrialization.
R.P. It was a gradual evolution. We had to industrialize
in Argentina without previously building a theory,
because we needed to supply more goods to the
population. But we could not pay for all the imported
goods, due to the fall of our exports and the deterioration
in our terms of trade. That’s the simple fact. Without
any theory, the whole of Latin America did the same.
From Mexico all the way down. Then, in my years of
quiet thinking, after I left the Central Bank, I started
theorizing. The concept of centre and periphery
emerged, and the concept of industrialization.
Let us deal with the latter and then with the former.
There was and there still is a great deal of confusion
about deterioration in the terms of trade. I was accused
many times of projecting into the future a tendency to
deteriorating terms of trade. I never said so. What I
said is, it is necessary to introduce technological
progress into agriculture. The more you increase
productivity, the less manpower you need per unit of
product. It is true you can increase production and
exports, but here comes the external part. If external
markets are open, and you can sell in them whatever
you produce, all right, that would be the most
economical way of employing manpower. But it so
happens that the laws of income elasticity are very
narrow. Very low income elasticity for primary
products; very high income elasticity for manufactured
products. How to deal with this? It is a very simple
arithmetic problem.
D.P. I remember, when I was in Santiago in 1955, that
Alex Ganz had calculated the overall U.S. income
elasticity of import demand for Latin American primary
products at 0.6, and Latin America’s income elasticity
of import demand for U.S. manufactured goods at 1.6.
So there was the gap.
R.P. And if you extend this reasoning to all the centres
of the world, given the very low price elasticity of our
exports, there is a certain moment when the attempt to
export more gives you less foreign exchange. What is
the role of industrialization and protection? Reasonable
protection gives an incentive to establish industries and
to divert factors of production to industry from
agriculture. Not to displace, but to divide the increments
of factors of production; one part to continue increasing
agriculture and one part for industrialization. This was
one of the reasons for the programming that we
advocated, to try and keep a dynamic balance between
the two activities.
D.P. One of the odd criticisms of you and ECLA was
that you were “against agriculture” because you
favoured industry.
R.P. Well, that’s absolutely nonsensical. Anyone
reading our literature will see that we put emphasis on
both things. One of the first things I did in 1955 when
I was consulted by the new Argentine government was
the establishment of an Institute for Technological
Research in Agriculture –INTA– with financial
independence. What I was trying to convey to people
was the idea of a dynamic balance between the two
sectors. I said, if there is no industrialization in the
developing countries, in the periphery, and if there is
technical progress in agriculture, then there will be a
tendency to deterioration in the terms of trade. The only
way to stop that is through industrialization. This was
my simple argument. I did not make any forecast about
the future. I presented my thesis as an argument in favor
of industrialization. Against agriculture? How could I
be? A man born and educated in Argentina, who
recognizes that the high standard of living in Argentina
by the beginning of the century was due to agriculture?
And I said in Brazil (in reply to the arguments of Jacob
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Viner13, who said “Prebisch ignored agriculture”) that
agriculture can be the source of wealth. Now, the thesis
of the orthodox economists was: If you need to
stimulate industry, then devalue. Devaluation would
increase the price of imports and would stimulate
exports, without any intervention in the free play of
the market. My reply was: Devaluation made for that
purpose, and not as a response to a previous process of
inflation, will promote inflation. It will be a socially
costly way of protecting. And those exports (and this
was the case of exports of primary products in
Argentina, that were already competitive) will see their
prices increase, and therefore production will increase,
and therefore prices will finally fall. Then Viner said,
“Put a tax on exports”. “But my dear [sir],” I replied,
“This is intervention into the market. What is the
difference between a tax on exports to prevent a fall in
prices of exports, and a selective tax on imports?”
Nonsensical. This is all. Even when I qualified these
points, when I explained these points, still I was accused
of incredible things in this matter.
D.P. Why do you think that happened?
R.P. Because of second- and third-hand reading. And
because there is a prejudice that probably you have seen,
[as] a member of a northern university. Really, David,
there is a certain arrogance and disparagement. They
don’t take us seriously. I’m sure that in Harvard they
don’t take us seriously. We are second-class economists,
or even third class. We are underdeveloped economists.
D.P. But could it also be because you represented a
challenge to U.S. exports, through your import
substitution measures? And also because of your
criticisms of transnational corporations? The U.S.
private sector and the U.S. government were worried
that your theories would have a doubly adverse effect
on them.
R.P. You are right. Let us take it bit by bit. I went to see
Frank Southard14 about the Latin American Common
Market. He was an open-minded man. I put as a case
that we were thinking of producing cars. “But would
you deprive us of our export market?” “Yes,” I replied,
“but as a result we could import more.”
D.P. Import more capital goods?
R.P. “Well,” he said, “the immediate effects would be
this. In the longer run something else may or may not
happen.” He saw the immediate effects. There was no
long-term policy conception. It was a plea of immediate
interests. But I was thinking not only of immediate
measures, but in longer run development terms. Don’t
forget that the long term starts now. You have to build
the short-term programmes within the framework of
your conception of long-term programming.
D.P. [What about] transnational [corporations]?
R.P. As always happens, the pendulum went too far.
We have seen transnationals everywhere. We have built
a theory of transnationalization. I think that it is
necessary, here again, to try to build a policy. Let me
take the case of oil. In 1955, during the short period
when I was advising the Argentine government, I
opposed with great firmness a policy of “open-door”
to oil companies. Argentina, for several reasons had to
increase its production of oil. So it was necessary to
have the cooperation of the oil companies. I said to the
President [Aramburu]15, “Don’t give concessions. Try
to get service contracts from the companies.” The
attitude of the companies was against this. Do you
remember Mr. Vance, who was head of the Export-
Import Bank? He went to Santiago. He said to me: “I
am a Republican. I consider that oil companies should
be free to invest without conditions. And I may tell you
that I’m willing to recommend to my government (he
was a very influential man) a different policy; a policy
of negotiations, joint ventures and service-contracts,
as you had preached.” I took the first plane, at 12 o’clock
precisely. I went immediately to see the Minister of
Finance. Unfortunately, the day before, President
Aramburu made an ambiguous declaration that was to
change our policy. When this was known in New York
and Washington, they retreated. And the country would
have to wait for many years. Now the companies are
prepared. They have learned. We need the
transnationals, but with very clear rules of the game:
duties, obligations and rights. We have to find new
policies. First, a selective policy, we have to define
where we need them and on what basis. The danger is
that, in this very difficult situation, they would try to
force the governments to give very favourable
conditions.
13
 Jacob Viner (1892-1970), the leading trade theorist of his
generation in the United States.
14
 United States representative to the IMF, 1948-1950.
15
 Pedro Eugenio Aramburu (1903-1970), President of Argentina
1955-1958.
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D.P. This all leaves me with the feeling that the ECLA
thesis or the Prebisch thesis of 1950-1960 continues to
have considerable relevance for Latin America today.
R.P. [For instance,] import-substitution, not as a
theoretical preference, but insofar as we cannot find
sufficient markets for our exports. That’s all. We need
to increase our income. We need to import more. Insofar
as we cannot import more by paying with exports, then
we have to pay with our own production.
D.P. What’s interesting to me is how the analytical
rationale still goes back to the writings of 30 years ago.
There are really very few new thoughts today on “what
to do” about the external constraint that were not
contained in the ECLA thesis of the early 1950s.
R.P. I regret to say so, but the Centre-Periphery concept
has not changed very much.
D.P. Nor has the terms of trade theoretical rationale;
nor has the import substitution industrialization
concept; nor has the concept underlying regional
cooperation.
R.P. I would like to see –really, David– a revolutionary
presentation of new ideas.
D.P. You were in ECLA from 1950 to 1963 as Executive
Secretary. I want to go back to some things that
happened during that period. I’m going to start with
the Alliance for Progress16. That was, for its time, a
noble experiment. Tell me how you got involved in the
Alliance.
R.P. I would say that for me there were two different
episodes. Adlai Stevenson17 visited Buenos Aires with
Senator Benson, who was a very sympathetic man. Both
of them asked to see me. Stevenson put some very
pertinent questions. This was before the Alliance. At
the end, after thanking me for the hospitality,
[Stevenson] asked me to write a memorandum to him.
I did so. And he used this memorandum as a basis for
an article that he published soon afterwards in Foreign
Affairs. I don’t know if he was influential or not with
John Kennedy.
Now, let’s turn to the Alliance for Progress. I was
not the promoter of the Alliance for Progress, but I
jumped on the wagon when the train was starting to
move. Not because I was against, but it so happened. I
underline this because many people believe that I was
the intellectual author of it. The Organization of
American States, during Kennedy’s early years,
attempted to introduce new life into itself, and formed
a committee of some 15 or 20 people, the majority of
whom were Latin Americans.
D.P. The OAS asked ECLA to send some people to
Washington to help?
R.P. Yes. The papers of ECLA were the basis, and our
presence contributed further. The OAS saw the
opportunity to get new force. Some weeks later, after
the presentation of this document by the OAS to the
State Department, I had a meeting with José Antonio
Mayobre (the Venezuelan Ambassador [to the U.S.])
plus Felipe Pazos18 and Felipe Herrera, who was already
President of the Inter-American Bank. Alfonso Santa
Cruz was in Washington and Jorge Sol was very active.
He was the head of the Department. [I drafted a letter
for the group to President Kennedy, saying] “This is
the moment to act: to have a hemispheric policy toward
Latin America.” And Mayobre, as the most important
man, being Ambassador, delivered this letter personally
to the President. And the President received it so well
that, a few days later, he said that the fundamental ideas
were ideas of the Economic Commission for Latin
America of the United Nations. Imagine how we felt,
how excited! Well, this is the positive part. What is the
negative part? That Richard Goodwin,19 without
consulting us, gave to this document the name “Alliance
for Progress.” This title sounded to me [like] a “Holy
Alliance!” It was not an Alliance: a mistaken and an
unfortunate name. I was supposed to be Chairman of a
Committee for coordinating the activities. But the
Argentine delegation opposed me.
D.P. Why? I thought you said earlier that they supported
you?
R.P. They did in ECLA. But I was acquiring too much
power and importance, and this is very serious in
16
 The Alliance for Progress, a Latin America-wide development
programme, was announced by President John F. Kennedy in March
1961. Through it, US$20 billion in foreign aid was to be channeled
into the region over a 10-year period.
17
 Adlai Stevenson (1913-1965). President Kennedy appointed him
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, with cabinet rank.
18
 Felipe Pazos (1913-2001). Cuban economist, IMF staff member
from 1946 to 1949.
19
 Richard N. Goodwin was special adviser and speechwriter for
President Kennedy (1961), Assistant Under-Secretary of State for
Inter-American Affairs (1961-1962), and Director of the
International Secretariat of the Peace Corps.
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Argentina, I’m sorry to say. So I had to help on this
Committee as a consultant, without any power. The
Alliance, as you know, was attacked both in the U.S.
and in Latin America. In [the] U.S., business interests
had the following thesis: “Why think in terms of social
reform? First stimulate growth, and then afterwards take
measures for better distribution of income.” And in
Latin America the landowners resisted the idea of
agrarian reform. Only the personality of President
Kennedy, and his personal influence on government,
could have saved the Alliance. But he died.
D.P. The U.S. business community was against the
Alliance because of what?
R.P. For them Latin America was a source of profit.
Anything that could adversely affect those profits was
bad. Land reform in itself was convenient. But wait
until the country is prosperous, very prosperous, before
introducing all these types of reform.
In some countries the landowners said they would
raise the flag against foreign companies. In Chile for
example. This was utterly unfortunate. Then came CIAP
[the Inter-American Committee for the Alliance for
Progress]. The World Bank did not pay any attention
to it, it continued taking its independent decisions. At
the beginning, Latin American countries sent good
delegations. When the group of “Nine Wise Men” was
replaced by the representatives of governments in
Washington, Embassy Secretaries were sent, people
without any qualifications. I always remember that, due
to the efforts of [Carlos] Sanz de Santa Maria, the
American government went there. [He] made a great
effort to get the presence of high-level representation
from the U.S., and he obtained that. The Latin American
representation was disastrous. No questions from them.
So that Carlos Sanz, Walter Sedwitz20 and myself had
to put the questions. This persuaded me that all this
experiment was condemned to failure.
D.P. One of the implicit criticisms that you are making of
the Alliance for Progress is that there never was a boss.
R.P. That’s it.
D.P. I’d also like to talk briefly about ECLA and you on
the one hand, and the IMF and the World Bank on the
other. There has been a long-standing history of an
adversarial relationship, at the intellectual and
analytical level. During the 1950s and the early1960s
(until you went to UNCTAD), ECLA and the IMF saw the
problems and therefore the solutions of Latin American
development from very different lights.
R.P. Yes. The theory of the Fund was based on the
conception that a balance of payments deficit was the
result of internal mismanagement. ECLA would not deny
internal mismanagement. I would have been the last
man to do that, because of my long experiences in
Argentina and my reading and writing of Argentine
monetary history. But to attribute to internal factors
what very frequently was the result of external factors
was a real calamity, a real theoretical calamity. For
instance, a favourable balance of payments during a
boom in the centres would increase imports that were
the source (the sole source or the greatest part) of taxes.
And the Treasury was worried as expenditures would
increase. And when the slump came, the deficit in the
balance of payments was unavoidable. The thesis of
the IMF was always “restrict credit to decrease imports.”
And we said, “Yes. But the way to decrease imports is
through a selective policy, that would at the same time
give impetus to new import substitutions.” Because, in
the long run, import substitution is essential. The Fund
would not link the two things, import substitution
(because it too was against the laws of the market), and
selectivity of imports (because it was an unacceptable
interference in the market). This was from the point of
view of monetary policy, the most important element
in our disputes with the Fund. Years later, many years
later, when Pierre-Paul Schweitzer21 became head of
the Fund, we got along personally very well. And I
remember that in one of the dinners of the Fund he told
me, “You know, Raúl, when I joined the Fund you were
presented to me as the Devil. I was told to be cautious
with you.” Then there was de Larosière,22 [I remember]
once, in the middle of his first period, he said in a speech
in Switzerland, “the Fund has always considered that
balance of payments disequilibrium in developing
countries is due only to internal factors. That is not so.
We have to give importance to external factors also.”
20
 Senior official of the OAS and Secretary of the Inter-American
Economic and Social Council responsible for supervising the
Alliance for Progress.
21
 Head of the IMF, 1963-1973.
22
 Jacques de Larosière, Managing Director of the IMF from 1978
to 1987; Governor of the Banque de France from 1987 to 1993,
and President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development from 1993 to 1998.
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D.P. He was the first one to say that publicly?
R.P. [He was] the first one to say that out loud and
clearly. A few days later, I was at a cocktail party at the
Fund when they said goodbye to one of the high
officials, I said, “Monsieur de Larosière, I congratulate
you. You were an innovator when you said what you
said in Switzerland.” And he replied, “Yes, but I would
like to innovate much more. However I have
resistances.” “Well,” I said, “Pope John XXIII had the
same resistances!”
D.P. I want to talk to you about the IBRD, the other
Bretton Woods twin23. You and ECLAC had intellectual
difficulties with the Bank. Not quite so strongly
adversarial [as with the IMF], but adversarial
nonetheless. Was that because the World Bank was not
so important? They were equally orthodox for a long
time.
R.P. I will tell you an anecdote that will give you a
glimpse of this. In my Argentine report in 1955, I was
preaching industrialization, and the need to promote
private initiative in industrialization. [First, use] macro
intervention of the State to create the broad lines, and
then let private initiative take advantage of this. Some
weeks after, I had to visit the Vice-President of the World
Bank, Burke Knapp, a very cordial and sympathetic
man. And Demuth24 was there. Demuth said, “Why are
you opposing private initiative in industrialization, and
promoting the growth of State enterprise? Why are you
recommending this?” “What?” I said to Burke Knapp,
“That’s utterly disconcerting to me. I was attacked in
my own country (as well as in other countries of Latin
America) for the way I was speaking in favour of private
initiative in industry as well as in agriculture and other
activities. How is it that the Bank, that should be well
informed, ignores this and instead presents me as a man
promoting the growth of State enterprises? I never did,
because I never believed in that.” Well, that shows you
how –even in institutions and circles where they should
know better– they hear something but they do not take
pains to see what is the degree of truth. And this is built
up as a consistent theory against you and against your
own thinking. This is the unfortunate part.
D.P. So ECLA was a gadfly to the Bank and Fund. You
were considered as not paying sufficient attention to
neoclassical theory?
R.P. Yes. Because I was not a neoclassical in the sense
that I considered that, even if it is true that private
initiative was absolutely important, it also had to be
combined with planning, with the broad lines of
planning, and this is what they did not accept.
D.P. All right. But after Eugene Black left [the World
Bank] and Robert MacNamara25 came in with Hollis
Chenery,26 the attitude wasn’t quite the same. It began
to be a little better.
R.P. Yes, with MacNamara and with George Woods.
D.P. Yes, he was in between.
R.P. MacNamara was always very cordial with me, but
that’s all. Chenery knew ECLA. Once before, we [had]
invited Chenery to spend a few months with ECLA.
D.P. So with Hollis Chenery, Mahbub Ul Haq27, Drag
[Avramovic]28 and MacNamara, there was a different
intellectual atmosphere in the Bank. [But in general]
in Washington, even our little ECLA Washington office
was considered somehow a beachhead of intellectual
opposition. Not only to the U.S. government, but also
to some of the specialized agencies of the United
Nations. In other words, ECLA had the reputation of
being a potential threat to the policies of the U.S.
government, of the Bank and [the] Fund, and GATT.29
R.P. Well, there are two sides in this picture. One thing
is the intellectual power that was one of our objectives,
with political implications. Not the transfer of power
from these institutions to UNCTAD; the most that it could
get (and this could have been very important), was to
be the centre of elaboration of new ideas, and the
transformation of these new ideas into political forces.
Not to try to manage the Bank or the Fund, but rather
23
 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the
original name of the World Bank.
24
 Richard Demuth, a World Bank economist, who worked on
agricultural matters, among others.
25
 Robert MacNamara, U.S. Secretary of Defense, 1961-1968.
President of the World Bank, 1968-1981.
26
 Professor of Economics at Harvard University and Chief
Economist of the World Bank under MacNamara.
27
 Mahbub Ul Haq (1934-1998), Pakistani economist and Vice-
President of the World Bank under MacNamara.
28
 Deputy Director of Economic Development of the World Bank
in the early 1960s and subsequently a member of the Board of
Governors of the Bank.
29
 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
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to examine what they were doing, to criticize, for
instance in the case of the Fund, its policy of
conditionality. One of the most important roles of
UNCTAD could have been a severe criticism of the policy
of conditionality. Not to say “We do not like
conditionality,” but [rather] “how conditionality could
be applied.”
D.P. Don Raúl, I want to ask you about why you created
ILPES?30
R.P. I did not create ILPES. The first idea about creating
the Institute came from David Owen. He said, “Raúl,
when you retire, you should have a research centre as
part of ECLA.” I said, “Fine idea.” This was a
conversation perhaps at the end of the 1950s. Once, I
was asked by Paul Hoffman to go to New York and
visit him. I did. “I will [allocate] resources for you to
create a planning institute for Latin America,” he said.
Probably David Owen explained this idea to Paul
Hoffman, and Hoffman –who established the
International Development Institute– was a
businessman with a very broad view of the world. We
became good friends and he gave me the idea, but I did
not ask anybody [to create] ILPES.
D.P. Now that we’ve mentioned ILPES, how do you feel
about it now?
R.P. Not enthusiastic, ILPES is lacking in resources. It
has been living a very precarious life. It doesn’t have a
research staff with continuity. And Latin America needs
a research staff as a complement to ECLA.
D.P. Let me go to regional integration. One of the great
achievements of ECLA was to expand the concept of
import-substitution industrialization from the national
level to the regional and sub-regional level. And then
to actually do the staff work for the creation of LAFTA,31
the Central American Common Market, the Andean
Group, and in some ways too, CARICOM.32 So that was
one of the specific practical and pragmatic
achievements of ECLA. You were a father of regional
integration in Latin America. How do you feel on
looking back? What should have been done differently?
How do you assess ECLA’s contribution to Latin
American regional cooperation?
R.P. This is a matter very close to my heart. I consider
one of the most vital interests of Latin America [is] to
give a strong impulse to this idea. Why has it not
advanced beyond a certain point? It was not a failure.
It was not a success. It was a mediocrity, a typical Latin
American mediocrity. Let us start by saying that during
the long years of prosperity of the centres, when Latin
America was finally persuaded about the need and the
possibility of exporting manufactured goods, the
pendulum went the other way. First, the pendulum was
in favour of import substitution, forgetting about the
export of manufactures. We were the first to say (and I
wrote this report at the beginning of the 1960s) that
industrialization in Latin America was asymmetrical.
We gave impetus to import substitution but we did not
give symmetrical treatment to the export of
manufactures. Duties on the one hand and subsidies on
the other, we were the first, and I underline this because
we were accused of being responsible for import
substitution and against exports. That was not the case.
The Latin American countries took advantage of
the boom years. Some of them were highly successful,
following a very intelligent policy (like Brazil) and a
consistent policy. Argentina started too, but then came
the disaster of lowering import duties, believing that
other countries would follow and we would liberalize
the trade of the world. An overvaluation of the currency
and plenty of money to pay for imports of manufactures
destroyed a great part of the industry in Argentina, and
therefore of the exports that had started in Argentina.
Now we have to rebuild all this. Lack of consistency,
David, was the main sin. And wrong ideas. I put in a
parallel way Brazil and Argentina. We have to learn
from the past, we cannot repeat ideas that we conceived
25 years ago. I was personally under the neoclassical
conception of free trade (“Let us assure a growing free
trade area in Latin America. Give time for industry to
adapt to a lowering of duties. Give as much time as
necessary”). In the light of experience, I think that was
a mistake. Let us see what is the real problem. It is our
deficit with the centres, for well known reasons. To this
you must add oil imports. Let us concentrate on import
substitution of those goods that are responsible for our
deficit with the centres (insofar as we cannot export in
sufficient amounts to pay for these imports).
D.P. Imports of capital goods and intermediate
products?
R.P. Yes. And the new goods produced by technology,
all these gadgets that you take enthusiastically. It so
30
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happens that these are the goods that generally need
broader markets. The old idea, this is the positive part
of our preaching of a quarter of a century ago. Not the
rest. But what is the lesson of this experience? Countries
such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico (not so many
others) that are in [a] condition to export capital goods,
but not at international prices, according to their own
schemes, could do that via a system of trade preferences
by the other countries. Let us say by Uruguay or
Ecuador giving preferences to Brazil, Argentina and
Mexico. But who pays the cost of this? Not Brazil. Not
Argentina. The cost is paid by Uruguay and Ecuador.
Why would they pay this cost? The idea was that they
would receive –that they would be able to export–
manufactures or other products to Brazil, Argentina and
Mexico, receiving preferences from them. That may
happen. My present idea is the following. Countries
interested in exports should give a subsidy, according
to certain established rules, in order to offer prices
equivalent to international prices. So that the less
developed countries of the area would be tempted to
import from them. Even so, this could create a surplus
in favour of the great markets. Part of the surplus should
be used in a fund [created by Brazil, Argentina, and
Mexico] to promote the establishment and development
of industries that could export at competitive prices,
with subsidies if necessary. [This scheme would not
require] from Brazil the full opening of markets, but at
prices competitive with internal prices. Not cutthroat
competition.
D.P. If this Fund was created and Brazil had an export
surplus, and was going to give part of the Fund to
Uruguay (to produce industrial goods that Brazil
wanted to import), who would own the industry in
Uruguay: the Brazilians or the Uruguayans?
R.P. Both. I would like to see Brazil, Argentina and
Uruguay working together. Not only for developing
these industries but also for export purposes. So that, if
they established one plant in Brazil, another plant would
be established in Argentina. They would divide the
work. In Brazil for certain types of capital goods; in
Argentina for other types of capital goods. But the same
enterprise, if possible. To merge interests.
D.P. It makes sense for Brazil and Argentina. But does
it make sense for Uruguay and Ecuador?
R.P. If they will receive imports at international prices
or close to international prices, at the same time they
will have resources for developing their own industries.
D.P. From this new fund?
R.P. Yes. And if this could be matched by the Inter-
American Bank or the World Bank–if they recognized
the need for import substitution on broader lines– this
would be perfect.
D.P. So what you’re really saying is a scheme like LAFTA
or the Central American Common Market, but one that
could be implemented at the level of two countries or
more. It could be very practical.
R.P. Yes, and another advantage is that, at present,
according to the new ALADI33 system, Brazil (let us say)
obtains from Uruguay a preference, giving Uruguay a
concession. Then Mexico comes and says, “I am willing
to give a concession to Uruguay. Give me a preference
similar to that of Brazil.” Brazil may say, “But I gave it
this concession on the basis of having this advantage.
Now let us renegotiate.” On the contrary, in this system,
it is open. Brazil is given a subsidy for the export of
machinery to any Latin American country entering into
the system. If Mexico or Argentina would like to export
the same goods, all right. There’s more competition.
All of them would have to contribute to the fund and
follow certain rules. Subsidies could not be given on
wild terms. Some rules would have to be established.
It’s not easy. We would have to abandon preferences.
D.P. You mean abandon GSP34?
R.P. No, preferences inside the area. This deserves
careful consideration. I may be wrong –I accept that
possibility– but also I may be right.
(Original: English)
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